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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this section 1983 action, we confront, once again, the 
fallout from the drug scourge afflicting our society. 
 
George Sherwood ("Plaintiff ") appeals from an order of 
the district court granting the motions of Defendants, 
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Ronald Bakley and James Barnum ("Defendants"), for 
summary judgment. Plaintiff sought relief against 
Defendants for allegedly violating his fourth and fourteenth 
amendment rights by falsifying an affidavit used to obtain 
a warrant to search Plaintiff's residence. The district court 
exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 
standard of review is plenary. 
 
I. 
 
The following facts are undisputed. A confidential 
informant ("informant") whose past tips led to several drug- 
related arrests, informed Defendant Barnum, chief of police 
in Franklin Township, New Jersey, that Plaintiff was selling 
methamphetamine from his residence. The informant told 
Defendant Barnum that he could arrange a narcotics 
purchase from Plaintiff. On April 4, 1990, Defendant 
Barnum, acting undercover, supervised a controlled drug 
purchase from Sherwood's residence. 
 
Defendant Bakley later drafted, and both Defendants 
signed, an affidavit used to seek a warrant to search 
Plaintiff's residence. The affidavit chronicled the controlled 
transaction by stating: 
 
(g) That after searching said informant, same was 
driven to the Sherwood residence by Chief Barnum 
who gave this informant a quantity of money and 
requested same go to Sherwood and purchase a 
quantity of purported methamphetamine. 
 
(h) That while being watched by Chief Barnum, the 
individual did go to the rear door of the residence and 
after knocking on same, George Sherwood came to the 
door and came outside. Then, both individuals went 
back into the house. 
 
(i) That a few minutes later, said person exited the 
house and returned directly to Chief Barnum's vehicle. 
At this time, said informant handed Chief Barnum a 
plastic bag containing a chunk of a white substance 
which same said was purchased from George 
Sherwood. 
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(Appellant's Br. at App. E-1.3.) Defendant Bakley later 
identified the substance as methamphetamine. 
 
Plaintiff contends that each of the quoted paragraphs is 
false because each omits and/or affirmatively 
misrepresents facts surrounding the controlled transaction. 
First, paragraph (g) of the affidavit omits that a third 
person, Michael Vasgar, who was unaware that Defendant 
Barnum was a police officer and that he was aiding in a 
controlled narcotics purchase, accompanied Defendant 
Barnum and the informant to Plaintiff's residence on April 
4, 1990.1 In this same paragraph, the affidavit states that 
Defendant Barnum handed money to the informant and 
instructed him to purchase methamphetamine from 
Plaintiff. The parties do not dispute that Vasgar 
accompanied Defendant Barnum and the informant to 
Plaintiff's residence and that Defendant Barnum actually 
gave Vasgar the money and instructed him to make the 
purchase. 
 
Paragraph (h) of the affidavit omits the identity of the 
"individual" who approached Plaintiff and disappeared into 
the residence with Plaintiff. The parties do not dispute that 
it was Vasgar, acting on Defendant Barnum's instruction, 
who did so. 
 
Finally, paragraph (i) of the affidavit omits that the 
"person" who returned from the residence to Defendant 
Barnum's vehicle was Vasgar. This paragraph then states 
that the informant handed the methamphetamine packet to 
Defendant Barnum and told Barnum that he had 
purchased it from Plaintiff. The parties also do not dispute 
that it was Vasgar who did so. 
 
On the basis of this affidavit, which Defendants admit 
was partially false, a Gloucester Township Municipal Court 
judge approved the issuance of a warrant to search 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Defendant Barnum never searched Vasgar prior to the controlled 
purchase. Because Defendant Barnum was undercover, any attempt to 
search Vasgar would have disclosed the controlled nature of the 
purchase. Defendants Bakley and Barnum apparently were concerned 
that Barnum's failure to search Vasgar could negate any probable cause 
garnered from the informant's tip and the controlled purchase. 
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Plaintiff's residence. The resultant search revealed the 
presence of marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, Valium 
and drug paraphernalia. Plaintiff eventually plead guilty in 
New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, to two counts of 
third degree possession with intent to distribute 
methamphetamine under N.J.S.A. §§ 2C: 35-5a(1) and 2C: 
35-5b(9). His conviction was later overturned by the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, after the 
state conceded that " `the affidavit contained a material 
falsehood, and that if the falsehood is excised . . . there is 
insufficient information to establish probable cause to 
support the warrant.' " (Appellant's Br. at App. E-2.2 to E- 
2.3.) 
 
Plaintiff thereafter instituted this section 1983 action. 
Plaintiff alleged that the search warrant was invalid 
because it was based on a falsified affidavit, and thus, the 
search of his residence violated his fourth and fourteenth 
amendment rights. Defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the basis that as public officials, they were 
entitled to qualified immunity. In reviewing the affidavit, the 
district court excised the affirmative misrepresentations 
and supplied the omitted facts "to show the buy which 
actually took place on April 4, 1990." Id. at App. E-10.15. 
The district court then reevaluated the municipal court 
judge's probable cause finding and concluded that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed and that this 
"corrected affidavit" established probable cause. The district 
court therefore granted Defendants' motions for summary 
judgment. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
As government officials engaged in discretionary 
functions, Defendants are qualifiedly immune from suits 
brought against them for damages under section 1983 
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 
232-33 (1991) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
526 (1985)). Where a defendant asserts a qualified 
immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment, the 
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plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the 
defendant's conduct violated some clearly established 
statutory or constitutional right. See In re City of Phila. 
Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 961 (3d Cir. 1995); D.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d 
Cir. 1992); see also Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 
1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 
Only if the plaintiff carries this initial burden must the 
defendant then demonstrate that no genuine issue of 
material fact remains as to the "objective reasonableness" of 
the defendant's belief in the lawfulness of his actions. 
Albright, 51 F.3d at 1535. This procedure eliminates the 
needless expenditure of money and time by one who 
justifiably asserts a qualified immunity defense from suit. 
See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. Thus, we begin with the 
predicate question of whether Plaintiff's allegations are 
sufficient to establish " `a violation of a constitutional right 
at all.' " In re City of Phila. Litig., 49 F.3d at 961 (quoting 
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232)); Middle Bucks Area Vocational 
Technical Sch., 972 F.2d at 1368. 
 
III. 
 
A section 1983 plaintiff who challenges the validity of a 
search warrant by asserting that law enforcement agents 
submitted a false affidavit to the issuing judicial officer 
must satisfy the two-part test developed by the Supreme 
Court in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). 
See Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502, 1504 (3d Cir. 
1993). This is true whether the alleged falsehood is an 
affirmative misrepresentation or a material omission. See, 
e.g., United States v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 742-43 & n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 582 (10th Cir. 
1990). 
 
Under Franks and its progeny, the plaintiff must prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the affiant 
knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a 
falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such 
statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the 
finding of probable cause. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72; 
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Frost, 999 F.2d at 742-43; Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569, 
573 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 
Defendants admit generally that the affidavit 
misrepresents the facts surrounding the controlled 
purchase by Vasgar, and that they acted with knowledge 
and deliberateness in drafting the affidavit as they did.2 
Thus, the first prong of the Franks standard is satisfied as 
to all of the falsehoods contained in the affidavit. 
 
We focus, then, on whether any of the affirmatively false 
statements or omissions are material to the finding of 
probable cause. Under Franks, falsehoods are deemed 
material to the finding of probable cause if the affidavit, 
"with the . . . false material set to one side . . . is 
insufficient to establish probable cause." Franks, 438 U.S. 
at 156. Thus, we proceed to remove the falsehoods from the 
affidavit that was submitted to the municipal court judge, 
and then, to determine whether Plaintiff has shown there to 
be a genuine factual dispute as to the reformulated 
affidavit's sufficiency to establish probable cause. In this 
initial step of removing the falsehoods from the affidavit, we 
will address the affirmative misrepresentations and 
omissions contained in the affidavit, in turn. 
 
IV. 
 
When confronted with an affirmative misrepresentation in 
an affidavit submitted to procure a search warrant, a court 
must excise the false statement from the affidavit. Id.; 
United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 379 (1st Cir. 1994); 
Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d at 1146, 1148 
(9th Cir. 1990). A section 1983 plaintiff then must prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that probable cause does 
not exist under the corrected affidavit; to wit, the plaintiff 
must prove that the false statements were material to the 
original probable cause finding. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Defendants argue, though, that they did not intend to violate 
Plaintiff's fourth amendment rights and that they believed, based on 
their consultation with a Camden County Assistant Prosecutor, that they 
were acting in a lawful manner. 
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The application of this rule in the case before us requires 
that we make two deletions from the affidavit that 
Defendants submitted to the municipal court judge. First, 
in paragraph (g) of the affidavit, we must delete the portion 
of the sentence that affirmatively states that Defendant 
Barnum supplied the informant with money and instructed 
him to purchase methamphetamine from Plaintiff. Second, 
in paragraph (i) of the affidavit, we must delete the second 
sentence. This sentence affirmatively states that the 
informant handed Defendant Barnum a package of 
methamphetamine, which the informant stated he had 
purchased from Plaintiff. 
 
V. 
 
As we have stated in the past, a court, when confronted 
with a false affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, must 
remove a falsehood created by an omission by supplying 
the omitted information to the original affidavit. See, e.g., 
Frost, 999 F.2d at 742-43; United States v. Calisto, 838 
F.2d 711, 714-16 (3d Cir. 1988). This approach is logical 
because a literal application of the Franks principle would 
require a court to excise an omission -- or, more 
accurately, the portion of the affidavit reflecting the 
omission. See, e.g., United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 
1486-87 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985). We again decline to employ 
such a "mechanistic" view of Franks.3 See Calisto, 838 F.2d 
at 715. 
 
The affidavit that Defendants presented to the municipal 
court judge contained four omissions. First, in paragraph 
(g), the affidavit omits that Michael Vasgar accompanied 
Defendant Barnum and the informant to Plaintiff's 
residence. Second, this paragraph also omits that 
Defendant Barnum did not search Vasgar, as he had done 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our independent research reveals apparent unanimity among our 
sister circuits as to supplying or adding any omitted facts to the 
affidavit. United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1995); 
Velardi, 40 F.3d at 573-74; United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 1029 
(10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Higgins, 995 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Stewart, 915 F.2d at 582 n.13; United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 
328 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 
                                8 
to the informant. Third, paragraph (h) -- which details an 
"individual['s]" leaving Defendant Barnum's vehicle, 
approaching Plaintiff's house, greeting Plaintiff and 
entering the house with Plaintiff -- fails to identify this 
"individual" as Vasgar. Instead, the paragraph, when read 
in the context created by the immediately preceding and 
subsequent paragraphs, implies that this "individual" was 
the informant. Finally, paragraph (i) likewise omits the 
identity of the "person" who exited Plaintiff's house and 
returned directly to Defendant Barnum's vehicle. Like 
paragraph (h), the statement implies that this "person" was 
the informant. 
 
Thus, we must supply these previously omitted facts to 
the affidavit. A reconstituted paragraph (g) must disclose 
that before arriving at the Sherwood residence, Defendant 
Barnum and the informant picked up Michael Vasgar at his 
residence and the three then drove to Plaintiff's residence. 
Defendant Barnum did not search Vasgar, and Vasgar did 
not know of the controlled nature of the narcotics 
purchase. Next, paragraph (h) must be rewritten to state 
that it was Michael Vasgar who went to the rear door of 
Plaintiff's residence, was greeted by Plaintiff and 
disappeared into the residence with Plaintiff. Finally, 
paragraph (i) must be altered to reflect that it was Michael 
Vasgar who exited Plaintiff's house and returned directly to 
Defendant Barnum's vehicle. 
 
VI. 
 
As a final matter, we must determine whether the district 
court properly concluded that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists as to whether this corrected affidavit establishes 
probable cause. Probable cause exists to support the 
issuance of a search warrant if, based on a totality of the 
circumstances, "there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
 
Typically, the existence of probable cause in a section 
1983 action is a question of fact. Groman v. Township of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995); Velardi, 40 
F.3d at 574 n.1. The district court may conclude in the 
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appropriate case, however, that probable cause did exist as 
a matter of law if the evidence, viewed most favorably to 
Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary factual 
finding.4 Because the issuing municipal court judge never 
reviewed the corrected affidavit, we review the district 
court's prediction that a reasonable municipal court judge, 
presented with the corrected affidavit, could not conclude 
that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable 
cause. Cf. Velardi, 40 F.3d at 574 n.1. 
 
We hold that the district court correctly determined that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the 
corrected affidavit supports a finding of probable cause. 
Defendant Barnum possesses specialized training in 
narcotics enforcement and fifteen years of experience in 
drug-related investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. 
Defendant Bakley is similarly trained. The informant had 
proved reliable in the past by providing information and 
assistance "leading to several arrests for drug-related 
offenses." (Appellant's Br. at App. E-1.2.) 
 
In this case, the informant told Defendant Barnum that 
Plaintiff was presently distributing "large quantities of 
alleged methamphetamine from his residence" and that a 
drug purchase from Plaintiff could be arranged. Id. Plaintiff 
has been arrested numerous times dating back to 1978 for 
drug-related offenses in both Camden and Gloucester 
counties. During the week of April 2, 1990, Defendants met 
with the informant, who tried unsuccessfully "to arrange a 
drug purchase from [Plaintiff], but [Plaintiff] was not at 
home." Id. Defendant Barnum met with the informant, for 
a second time, on April 4, 1990. At this meeting, the 
informant told Defendant Barnum that he had arranged a 
drug purchase from Plaintiff. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As we recently noted, tension exists as to the proper role of the judge 
and jury where qualified immunity is asserted. Grant v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has held 
that the application of qualified immunity is a question of law. Siegert, 
500 U.S. at 232. In contrast, the existence of probable cause to support 
a warrant, when raised in a section 1983 action, is a question of fact. 
Groman, 47 F.3d at 635. This may prove problematic in attempting to 
resolve immunity issues in the early stages of litigation where a genuine 
and material factual dispute exists concerning probable cause. 
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After searching the informant, Defendant Barnum and 
the informant drove to Michael Vasgar's residence and 
recruited him to assist in the transaction. Defendant 
Barnum did not search Vasgar because Vasgar did not 
know that Defendant Barnum was a law enforcement 
officer and that he was partaking in a controlled narcotics 
purchase. 
 
The affidavit then recites that Defendant Barnum and the 
informant watched from Barnum's vehicle as Vasgar 
approached and knocked on the rear door of Plaintiff's 
residence, was greeted by Plaintiff, and both men went into 
the residence. Next, the affidavit reports that Vasgar exited 
the residence "a few minutes later" and returned directly to 
Defendant Barnum's car. 
 
As a result of the revisions made to the affidavit by the 
district court, the next paragraph now ambiguously refers 
to "evidence" received by Defendant Barnum from the 
ostensible transaction. Finally, as relevant, the affidavit 
states that Defendant Bakley received a positive response 
for methamphetamine after conducting a field test of this 
"substance." 
 
We acknowledge that as a result of the need to delete the 
affirmative misrepresentations contained in the original 
affidavit, the corrected affidavit contains no direct reference 
to Vasgar's being given money and instructions by 
Defendant Barnum to purchase methamphetamine from 
Plaintiff. Also, the corrected affidavit does not state 
explicitly that Vasgar returned to Defendant Barnum's 
vehicle and handed him a package of methamphetamine 
that he claimed to have purchased from Plaintiff. Finally, 
the affidavit discloses Vasgar's role in the controlled 
purchase and that he was not searched prior to his visit 
with Plaintiff. 
 
We find, however, that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
that the deletion of the affirmatively false statements and 
the supplying of the omitted information materially affected 
the existence of probable cause. Defendants received a tip 
from a reliable informant and corroborated the tip with a 
controlled narcotics purchase. While the details of the 
transaction are not ideally set forth in the corrected 
 
                                11 
affidavit, the affidavit still states clearly the content of a 
reliable informant's tip, the purpose of the April 4, 1990 
visit to Plaintiff's residence, Vasgar's unwitting assistance 
in the effort, and Defendants' receipt of methamphetamine 
from the visit. 
 
We conclude then that Defendants' affirmative 
misrepresentations and omissions were not material to the 
probable cause finding. Therefore, we hold that Plaintiff has 
failed to carry his initial burden of alleging a violation of a 
constitutional right. In light of Plaintiff's failure to carry his 
initial burden, Defendants were not required to 
demonstrate the objective reasonableness of their beliefs in 
the lawfulness of their actions. See Velardi, 40 F.3d at 573; 
Forster, 896 F.2d at 1148. 
 
VII. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of the 
district court granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants. 
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SLOVITER, Chief Judge, dissenting. 
 
I am unable to join the decision of the majority affirming 
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the 
defendants based on qualified immunity. I believe the 
question before us is not, as the majority states at the 
outset, one arising out of the fallout from the drug scourge, 
but is instead whether zealous law enforcement agents 
should be immune from civil liability when they deliberately 
falsify information in presenting evidence to the magistrate 
in order to obtain a search warrant. 
 
There are relevant facts in this matter that I believe merit 
additional consideration before we foreclose civil liability. 
Sherwood was the subject of two indictments, one in 
Gloucester County and the other in Camden County. He 
pled guilty to five charges, three in the Gloucester County 
indictment and two in the Camden County indictment. The 
latter two charges were both for third degree possession 
with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and only those 
are at issue here. Sherwood's guilty plea came only after 
the state trial judge denied his motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of the Camden County 
search. Sherwood was sentenced to imprisonment on terms 
to run concurrent with each other and with those on the 
Gloucester County charges. 
 
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate 
Division, affirmed the convictions and sentences on the 
Gloucester County charges, but vacated the convictions 
arising under the Camden County indictment because the 
search and seizure were predicated on a warrant obtained 
upon an affidavit based on knowingly false information. In 
fact, the per curiam decision of the state appellate court 
states that "[t]he State concedes that, `the affidavit 
contained a material falsehood, and that if the falsehood is 
excised . . . there is insufficient information to establish 
probable cause to support the warrant.' " App. at E-2.2-3. 
Upon remand, the trial division then vacated the judgment 
of conviction on the Camden County indictment, "it . . . 
appearing that the State has insufficient evidence absent 
the suppressed evidence to even have the case submitted to 
a jury." App. at E-3-1. 
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In light of this finding by the state court and the state's 
concession, I find surprising the majority's conclusion that 
the defendant officers' misrepresentations and omissions 
were not material to the finding of probable cause by the 
magistrate. Admittedly, the New Jersey courts did not need 
to make the sophisticated analysis of the precedent 
engaged in by the majority because the state conceded the 
issue. But it must have had some basis to make such a 
concession. Thus, I can only attribute the majority's 
conclusion to its decision that the defendants' affidavit 
should not only be redacted of all of the 
misrepresentations, but that the affidavit should be 
corrected to include the relevant facts omitted by the 
officers. It is with that process that I disagree. 
 
The relevant analysis must begin with Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), where the issue arose in 
the context of a defendant's appeal from his conviction in 
state court on the ground that the warrant affidavit was 
procured by misrepresentations. Although proof of 
negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient, the Supreme 
Court rejected the state's argument that a defendant may 
never challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by 
police to procure a search warrant. Instead, the Court held 
that such a challenge may be made "where the defendant 
makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false 
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the 
warrant affidavit, . . . if the allegedly false statement is 
necessary to the finding of probable cause . . . .". Id. at 155. 
 
In discussing whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary 
when such a challenge is made by a defendant seeking to 
exclude the fruits of the search on the basis of a Fourth 
Amendment violation, the Court noted that a hearing is not 
required "if, when material that is the subject of the alleged 
falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains 
sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a 
finding of probable cause." Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added). 
Thus, Franks speaks only in terms of setting aside the 
falsities, and says nothing about substitution of the omitted 
facts. 
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As the majority notes, many circuits seem to have 
extended Franks not only to exclude material 
misstatements from the reconstituted affidavits but also to 
include material omissions. See e.g., United States v. 
Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Frost, 999 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
1001 (1993); United States v. Higgins, 995 F.2d 1, 4 (1st 
Cir. 1993); United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th 
Cir. 1980). However, the inquiry in those cases was made 
in criminal proceedings pursuant to the defendant's 
challenge to the affidavit on Fourth Amendment grounds, 
and was designed to ascertain "whether the affidavit would 
have provided probable cause if it had contained a 
disclosure of the omitted information." Frost , 999 F.2d at 
743. 
 
That is not the issue before us. Instead, in this civil 
action for damages for violation of the plaintiff's 
constitutional rights, we must decide whether 
reconstitution of the warrant affidavit should be permitted 
to provide a defense on behalf of those police officers who 
conceded that they knowingly misrepresented the facts. I 
fail to see any persuasive reason in the majority's opinion 
why we should do so. It is not required by the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence on this issue; certainly not by Franks 
where the Court, albeit in another context, voiced its 
disapproval of insulation of an officer's deliberate 
misstatements. See 428 U.S. at 164 n.6. 
 
The majority relies on this court's opinion in United 
States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1988), where we 
rejected a criminal defendant's argument that we should 
limit our redaction of the warrant affidavit to striking the 
intentionally misleading portions and determine the 
existence of probable cause by reference only to the 
redacted document. See id. at 715. Instead, we considered 
whether the affidavit would still have provided probable 
cause if the facts omitted from the affidavit had been 
disclosed, i.e., that the information about the defendant 
that led to the issuance of the warrant passed through the 
hands of two additional police officers. See id. We decided 
that even with the information that had been omitted to 
conceal the participation of two law enforcement officers in 
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order to protect the original confidential informant, there 
would have been probable cause. Therefore we concluded 
that there was no causal connection between the deception 
and the challenged search. See id. at 716. 
 
But Calisto, like the defendants in the cases referred to 
above, was a criminal defendant seeking to challenge the 
validity of the search, and there are obvious policy reasons 
why a court may be reluctant to suppress the fruits of a 
search, notwithstanding erroneous information in an 
affidavit, if the objective circumstances would have 
supported a finding of probable cause. It is much more 
difficult to find a policy argument that would justify 
shielding police officers who knowingly lied in the warrant 
affidavit from a civil suit seeking damages for redress of a 
constitutional injury. That Sherwood was injured is patent 
from the record, for he was indicted and ultimately 
sentenced based on an affidavit that the State subsequently 
conceded did not establish probable cause. 
 
Significantly, the Calisto opinion stressed that if there 
were any intent on the police officer's part to mislead the 
magistrate, it "was occasioned not by a scheme to deceive 
the magistrate about a material fact, but by a desire to 
withhold a fact not material to the magistrate's task." Id. at 
715. In contrast, in this case Barnum and Bakley withheld 
the information that it was Vasgar, not the confidential 
informant, who was sent to buy methamphetamine from 
Sherwood without having been searched for drugs before he 
undertook the buy because they were apparently concerned 
that a magistrate might not otherwise issue a warrant. They 
had neglected to search Vasgar before the buy, and 
therefore prepared a false and misleading affidavit which 
made it seem as if it were the confidential informant who 
was searched and who made the drug purchase thereafter. 
Unlike the situation in Calisto, in Sherwood's case the 
materiality of the omission was deemed determinative by 
the state court and as a result it vacated Sherwood's 
conviction on those counts. 
 
This court has already indicated the approach to be 
followed when the issue is not whether evidence should be 
suppressed but whether the officers should be shielded 
from liability for civil damages by qualified immunity. The 
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test under qualified immunity is an objective one, and an 
officer will not be subject to liability for an illegal search or 
seizure merely because it later develops that the warrant 
was invalid. On the other hand, we have stated that "If a 
police officer submits an affidavit containing statements he 
knows to be false or would know are false if he had not 
recklessly disregarded the truth, the officer obviously failed 
to observe a right that was clearly established. Thus, he is 
not entitled to qualified immunity." Lippay v. Christos, 996 
F.2d 1490, 1504 (3d Cir. 1993)(citations omitted)(emphasis 
added). This view has also been expressed by other circuits. 
See Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 
1995)(holding that if officer submitted an affidavit that 
contained statements he knew to be false "the shield of 
qualified immunity is lost"); Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 
1555 (11th Cir. 1994)(holding that officer had violated a 
clearly established constitutional right by seeking arrest 
warrant on conclusory affidavit); Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 
277, 282 (7th Cir. 1985)(stating that "in cases in which 
suppression would be warranted because an officer was 
dishonest or reckless in preparing a warrant affidavit, that 
officer would not enjoy good faith immunity for civil 
damages."). 
 
The majority relies on the decision of the Second Circuit 
in Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 1994), a § 1983 
case against two police officers alleging that they had 
materially misled the magistrate in order to procure a 
search warrant. In that civil case the court did allow an 
affidavit to be corrected to show that the police officers, 
who had not made the personal observations on which the 
original warrant was predicated, had relied on observations 
of others. The court held that if the affidavits were corrected 
with the omitted facts, there still would have been probable 
cause. See id. at 574-75. 
 
Velardi is the only case we have found that allowed 
"correction" in order to provide police officers who 
deliberately misrepresented material facts with qualified 
immunity. In Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 
1990), the only other § 1983 case cited by the majority in 
its list of circuit decisions, see Majority Op. at 8 n.3, the 
"correction" of the warrant affidavit was not made to shield 
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the officer but, on the contrary, to show why he was not 
entitled to such a shield. The plaintiff in Stewart based his 
allegation of police misrepresentation on the officer's failure 
to state in the warrant affidavit that the principal 
complainant had recanted his testimony and confessed it 
was a fabrication. The court held that if the affidavit were 
modified with this exculpatory evidence, it would not 
support probable cause. Thus, had there been no material 
issue of fact, the modification would have defeated qualified 
immunity rather than shielded the police from suit. See id. 
at 582-83. 
 
The distinction was specifically noted by the Eighth 
Circuit when it stated: "We express no view as to whether 
a defendant whose affidavit contained a deliberate 
falsehood should be entitled to qualified immunity if a 
corrected affidavit would still provide probable cause. A 
more stringent rule may be appropriate when a liar seeks 
the benefit of this defense." Bagby v. Brondhaver, 98 F.3d 
1096, 1099 n.2 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 
Ultimately, of course, a plaintiff in a § 1983 case must 
prove his or her case before a jury if the path to that end 
is not prevented by the qualified immunity defense. That 
was the process that we followed in Lippay. I would follow 
that process here, as the knowing and deliberate 
misstatements are conceded. Thus, I respectfully dissent. 
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